Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and VietnamDescription
Without exception, armies are accused of preparing to fight the previous war. In Learning to eat soup with a knife, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagl, a veteran of Operation Desert Storm and the current conflict in Iraq - is of the view that the crucial question now, as the armies of adapting to changing circumstances over the conflicts for which you are initially unprepared. Through the use of archival material sources and interviews with the participants in both engagements, Nagl compares the development of the counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960 with what in the Vietnam War from 1950 to 1975.
In examining these two events, Nagl-the subject of a recent "New York Times Magazine story by Peter Maass-argues that organizational culture is the key to the ability to learn from unexpected conditions, a variable that explains why the British army successfully carried counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army not to do so, Vietnam, the treatment of war rather than a conventional conflict. Nagl concluded that the British army because of its role as a colonial police and the organizational structure, which by their history and national culture, was in a better position to quickly learn and the lessons of counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency.
With a new preface by the author on the combat experiences in Iraq, learn to eat soup with a knife is a timely examination of the lessons from previous counterinsurgency campaigns, is celebrated by both military leaders and interested civilians.
Amazon.com
In examining these two events, Nagl-the subject of a recent "New York Times Magazine story by Peter Maass-argues that organizational culture is the key to the ability to learn from unexpected conditions, a variable that explains why the British army successfully carried counterinsurgency in Malaya but why the American army not to do so, Vietnam, the treatment of war rather than a conventional conflict. Nagl concluded that the British army because of its role as a colonial police and the organizational structure, which by their history and national culture, was in a better position to quickly learn and the lessons of counterinsurgency during the Malayan Emergency.
With a new preface by the author on the combat experiences in Iraq, learn to eat soup with a knife is a timely examination of the lessons from previous counterinsurgency campaigns, is celebrated by both military leaders and interested civilians.
Amazon.com
